AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY AS COGNITIVE SCIENCE: A CRITIQUE OF BRUCE JANZ’S METHODOLOGY

Abstract

The quest to demarcate authentic African philosophy from pseudo-African philosophy, a challenge imposed on African philosophy as a result of the Hegelian challenge and the now stale “Great debate,” invariably led to the invention of different methods in African philosophy; such as hermeneutics, eclecticism, conversationalism etc. This work is a reflection on the enactivistic rendering of African philosophy by Bruce Janz. Janz new book marks a watershed in the history of African philosophy and aim to usher in the idea ofcognitive science in African philosophy. Although this is a laudable work, the scope and method of enactivism is insufficient for the discourse of African philosophy. The work argues that though Janzenactivistic method has a noble motivation, its defence of ethonologism in African philosophy betrays the search for a method in African philosophy that his work is a part of. This paper found that most methods in African philosophy originated from the critique on ethno-philosophy in the first place. Hence, to defend ethnological method in African philosophy is to be swimming against the current and/or turning African philosophy upside down. Furthermore, this paper submits that Janz’s praised of PaulinHountondji’s idea of African philosophy contradicts his attempt to defend ethonologism in African philosophy. While adopting the method of critical analysis which is native to philosophical thinking, this article argues that for African philosophy to show that it is truly philosophical and truly African there is need for an all-encompassing method that will take cognizance of the different issues in African philosophy, and Janz pretentious definition of African philosophy by extension has not done so.