INNOCENT I. ASOUZU'S THEORY OF BEING AND THE ONE-MANY PROBLEM IN ONTOLOGY: AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH

Abstract

Innocent I. Asouzu, while delving into the realm of ontology, identified a crucial issue within the Western philosophical framework and African ontological expressions - the prevalence of an exclusivist and elitist mentality. Asouzu posits that the practical significance of ontology can be revitalized by redefining or rearticulating it through the lens of complementarity/ibuanyidanda. In his endeavor to introduce a fresh complementary ontology, Asouzu primarily focused on “What is being?” while overlooking the inquiry into “Why do beings exist rather than nothing?” This narrow approach limits the explanatory capacity of his ontology in elucidating the essence of being within a multifaceted reality. Asouzu asserts that existence entails being in a complementary connection with other absent elements. Yet, he fails to acknowledge that this manner of defining being assumes the very concept it aims to establish, namely, complementarity. Furthermore, by emphasizing the ultimate purpose (i.e., fulfilling a missing element of reality) as the sole criterion for existence, Asouzu understates the structure and organization of intelligible reality, which enables/affords relationality. This study uses analytic and evaluative methods to explicate Asouzu's theory of being. It argues that Asouzu's innovative complementary ontology could enhance its explanatory efficacy by addressing these issues.