THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DAVID HUME'S “RADICAL” EMPIRICISM

Abstract

Perhaps, it is important to highlight right from the beginning that the term “radical empiricism” is used here in a sense different from its normal use in the philosophical parlance to refer to a philosophical doctrine propounded by the American philosopher, William James. Here, it is employed to qualify Hume's version of empiricism and show its marked deviation from the empiricist tradition of his predecessors. This paper, therefore, explores the “radical” nature of Hume's version of empiricism and exposes the explicit and implicit philosophical implications of his claims. It analyzes and evaluates Hume's claims about the origin and foundation of knowledge, the narrow limits of the human mind, the emptiness of the notions of substance and causality and the irrationality of holding on to the metaphysical ideas of the self, God and the world. It is the opinion of this paper that Hume's radical empiricism deals all hopes of establishing the foundations of knowledge a heavy blow; the philosophical equivalence of bulldozing the entire edifice of epistemic certainty. The epistemological implications of Hume's philosophy are examined at length. Towards the end of this paper, a section which briefly examines the relationship between Hume's “radical” empiricism and the radical empiricism of William James is included