CRITIQUE OF ROGER GIBSON'S “FLANAGAN ON QUINEAN ETHICS AND THE NATURE OF AFRICAN MORAL VALUE”

  • Babatunde Olatunji ONI
  • Peter Abiodun OJO
Keywords: Africa moral value, Ethics, Naturalism, Relativism

Abstract

Tbetween the Western philosophical traditions, particularly W.V.O. Quine's ethical framework. Discussion in this paper navigates the complex interplay between Quinean Ethics and the distinctive characteristics of African moral values, shedding light on the compatibility and challenges posed by their intersection. Gibson explores how Quinean Ethics, grounded in naturalistic and empirical perspectives, intersects with the diverse moral landscape of Africa. Quine's emphasis on a scientific approach to ethics, rooted in empirical observations and linguistic analysis, is contrasted with the nuanced and culturally embedded nature of African moral system. The critical evaluation probes the extent to which Quinean Ethics can accommodate the pluralistic and context-specific dimensions inherent in African moral frameworks. Keeping this in mind, this paper adopts critical and analytic methods of philosophical inquiry to examining how Gibson's discourse reshapes the dialogue between Quinean Ethics and African moral values. The critical-analytical method is adopted to engage Gibson's work for broader philosophical conversations on ethics, cultural diversity, and the universalizability of ethical theories. It explores the challenges and opportunities presented by the integration of diverse cultural perspectives into the ethical discourse, emphasizing the need for a more inclusive and globally informed ethical framework. Through a rigorous examination of the intersections and divergences between these philosophical traditions, the analysis contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the complexities involved in cross cultural ethical dialogue

Published
2024-09-25
Section
Articles