KARL POPPER, CRITICAL RATIONALISM AND AFRICAN SCIENCE

Abstract

The idea of a philosophy of science within the African context is fraught with complexity. This complexity arises from the tendency of African scholars to immerse themselves in local discourses rather than integrate global ideologies that could potentially bridge the existing knowledge gap. This paper aims to explore the congruence between Popper’ s philosophy of science and the epistemological traditions indigenous to Africa. Specifically, it seeks to analyse the foundational tenets of critical rationalism and its role in shaping the philosophy of science; evaluate the relevance of Popper’s falsificationist model in addressing the epistemic challenges prevalent within African scientific discourse; contextualise Popper’s principles within African science and highlight potential synergies and areas of epistemic friction; and propose a framework through which critical rationalism can be adapted to enhance the scientific and philosophical rigor of African scholarship. The paper employs a qualitative, philosophical analysis that synthesises primary texts from Karl Popper alongside some secondary literature on African epistemology. It adopts a comparative approach and juxtaposes Popper’s falsifiability criterion with African traditions of knowledge production. The paper posits that Popper’s insistence on the refutability of scientific theories resonates with certain African intellectual traditions, particularly those grounded in collective reasoning and iterative knowledge refinement.. The paper concludes with the recommendations that African scholars should engage critically with global scientific standards without compromising the integrity of indigenous epistemologies, and emulate a culture of open critiques and ensure that research methodologies adhere to both rigorous falsificationist standards and culturally embedded structures of collective knowledge production..