CONCEPT AND HUMAN COGNITION: A CASE FOR NON-CONCEPTUALISM

Abstract

The meaning of concept, particularly its place in the cognitive process of perception, is one of the long-standing controversies in contemporary epistemology. Scholars of the conceptualist persuasion, such as John McDowell, D. W. Hamlyn, Bill Brewer and Sonia Sedivy, claim that the content of perceptual experience is always in a kind of relation with propositional attitude. In propositional attitude beliefs, judgments, hopes and aspirations are instantaneously captured in perception. If this is granted, then, it becomes difcult to account for the phenomenon of non-conceptuality in perception. However, a critical look at the conceptualists' arguments quickly reveals the conation of sensation and perception in the process of concept formation. In view of this, this paper critically examines and analyses the notion of concept and argues that if the role of concept in the cognitive process of perception is determined, the long-standing problem about the nature and characterization of the content of human perceptual experience will naturally dissolve. Whilst distinguishing and separating sensation from perception, the paper establishes that concept-formation is not generic to perception and that there is a place for non-conceptuality in perception. This paper employs conceptual analytical tools to distinguish the place of concept, sensation and perceptual experience from the cognitive status of perception, and makes a case for the phenomenon of non-conceptuality in perception. The paper is a critical analysis of the word, “concept” both from the traditional and contemporary perspectives. It aims to determine the place of concept in perception and how it relates to sensation. Some conceptualists' arguments on the nature and characterization of the content of perceptual experience are also examined. The paper concludes that perceptual cognition is a process, and concept and concept-formation is the end product of perception. To this end, the possibility of non conceptual content in perception as derivable in sensation is no longer a problem.