THE MENKITI-GYEKYE COMMUNTARIAN DEBATE ON PERSONHOOD IN AFRICA: THE THIRD WAY OPTION

Abstract

The concept of Personhood has been a subject of intense academic debate among African intellectuals in the new past. This paper interrogates the Ifeanyi Menkiti's radical communitarian strand and Kwame Gyekye's moderate communitarian strand. On the one 1 hand Menkiti argues the radical communitarian thesis that Personhood in African thought emphasizes communal and interdependent social relationships. Personhood is not solely dened by individual characteristics, but rather by one's relationships with others and their 2 role within the community. On the second hand is Gyekye's moderate communitarian thesis according to which individuals have inherent rights and dignity that must not only be respected and protected, but which must be balanced with community interest. I argue that, these modes of thinking not only ignores the essentials of Personhood, namely, self determination and the rights of the individual, it exposes the overbearing mode of the community and scuttles the inherent freedom and primacy of the individual thought and his right to question communal ideas. Life in its existential meaning is human fellowship and solidarity among individuals though, individual rights and freedom of self-expression within the communities are not in doubt. I argue the conclusion that, traditional communal values can be reconciled with modern individualistic conceptions for a more inclusive and relational understanding of Personhood. Communal ethos matures the individual in the community though, this does not have ontological and epistemological precedence over individual persons. This is the third way that is proposed here as a nuanced understanding of Personhood. This option balances individual rights with communal responsibilities. It emphasizes the importance of context and culture, and provides a more comprehensive understanding of African concept of Personhood.