THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF DISAGREEMENT: HUME, KANT, AND THE CURRENT RELEVANCE

Abstract

The paper explores the epistemology of disagreement in the epistemologies of David Hume and Immanuel Kant. Hume in his epistemology—especially in his empiricism—lays emphasis on the role of sense experience and the fallibility of human reason, suggesting that disagreement often arises from the limitations and biases inherent in human cognition. Hume in his empiricism did not believe in consensus or middle ground the analysis of human knowledge, differing experiences and interpretations, advocating for a skeptical approach to conflicting viewpoints. Kant, contrastingly, introduced critical philosophy in which reason and a priori knowledge play pivotal roles in his Critique of Pure Reason. The principle of universality in the critique played pivot role resolving the disagreements especially in the dichotomy of rationality and empiricism. The universal rational principles ensure that disagreements can be resolved through the application of universal rational principles, positing that the proper use of reason can lead to consensus. Kant's framework suggests that apparent disagreements may stem from misunderstandings or misapplications of these principles, and that genuine rational discourse can bridge epistemic divides. This study examines the various dimensions of disagreement in epistemology and show the Kantian approach in resolving disagreement. The paper synthesizes these perspectives, examining the implications of Hume's skepticism and Kant's rationalism in the context of modern epistemological theories. It investigates whether contemporary approaches align more closely with Hume's fallibilism or Kant's optimism about reason, and how these philosophical legacies inform current understandings of disagreement. The paper concludes that the proper understanding of Hume and Kant's respective handling of the epistemology of disagreement will serve as the model for managing disagreement or differences in scholarship and among scholars.