DOES INTERNATIONAL LAW BAN THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION? A PHILOSOPHICALAPPRAISAL

Abstract

The right to self-determination (SD) is one of the most contested right today both in international law and moral philosophy but especially in international law. This is because the right to SD and the right to state sovereignty (SS) are both ambiguously codified in international instruments without specification on which of the two should be prioritized when both come into conflict. The result is that international lawyers and jurists have defended at least four major theories as the correct representation of international law on the right to SD, namely, that international law bans the right to SD, international law supports primary right to SD, international law maintains remedial right to SD and that international law is neutral on the right to SD. Using both the historical and hermeneutical methods, this study interrogates the specific claim that international law prohibits the right to SD. After conceding that the jurists and international lawyers who advocate this position do so for obvious reasons of international peace and stability, the study argues that the position cannot be sustained either legally or morally as it has no specific solid support in law and practice and does not meet the basic prerequisites of justice. Above all, the study argues contrary to the proponents of the theory, that the theory is not suitable for international stability and peace and therefore recommended the need for further study to develop a theory that satisfies global need for justice, peace and stability