REASONS AS CAUSES: A CRITICAL RE-EXAMINATION OF DONALD DAVIDSON'S STANDARD THEORY OF ACTION THROUGH CONTEXTUAL-NORMATIVE INTEGRATION

Abstract

Donald Davidson's Standard Theory of Action stands as one of the leading perspectives in the philosophy of action. It claims that human actions are intentional when explained by the reasons that act as causes of the action. Although his framework successfully bridges empirical causation with normative rationalization, it continues to face perpetual objections which include the problem of insufficient normativity and deviant causal chains. This research supports Davidson's causal thesis using critical conceptual analysis and cross-cultural comparative methodology called "Contextual-Normative Integration." I argue that reasons act as causes within culturally-embedded normative systems, instead of existing abstractly from social context. I argue that the problem of deviant causation can be addressed by stipulating that causal relations function through culturally-validated rational processes inspired by insights from African philosophy of communitarianism to enhance Davidson's individualistic framework. Comparing African and Western approaches to agency using cross-cultural analysis, I argue that the standard theory of Davidson holds explanatory capacity when embedded in a community-based normative framework. The paper demonstrates that while Davidson's basic understanding of reasons as causes continues to be true, there is need to align with contextual norms to effectively tackle contemporary challenges in cross-cultural ethics, legal accountability and moral obligation. This contextual-normative approach aims to preserve the scientific credibility of causal explanation while upholding the irreducibly normative and social dimensions of human action and agency.