WHAT CAN A WOMAN KNOW? EPISTEMIC BIAS AS DEPERSONALIZATION

  • Francis Eshemomoh IKHIANOSIME
Keywords: Epistemic bias, Depersonalization, Gender, Human person, Power dynamics.

Abstract

Since such publications like Lorraine Code’s essay, “Is the sex of the knower epistemically significant?” and Sandra Harding’s “Is Gender a variable in conceptions of rationality: a survey of issues” the conversation of the relation between gender and knowledge has remained an intellectually polemic area of discussion in epistemology, particularly, feminist epistemology. The relation between gender and knowledge is not merely theoretical, but it also involves power relations. Power dynamics have a lot to play with knowledge acquisition and how we accord truth values to an epistemic agent. Although, mainstream epistemology pretends to be gender neutral with the knowing subject, such claim can arguably be said to be nominal rather than practical. This paper interrogates particularly how we determine knowing subjects. It argues that the female gender or woman has sometimes been treated with discrimination in determining whether she is a knowing subject or not. This paper further situates this discrimination as fallouts of biases or prejudices. Far from creating an unwholesome epistemic situation such biases are associated with power. Epistemic bias against women apart from showing how gendered-power structure of societies affect the shape and possibilities of knowledge production, it further argues that such epistemic bias also depersonalizes the woman and this is a form of dehumanization. This paper concludes with an argument for an inclusive gender-balanced structure of epistemic relations as a pathway that can create a more robust epistemic relation for knowledge. It is believed this can further strengthen the understanding of the human person as an epistemic agent.

Published
2021-11-25