TESTIMONIAL KNOWLEDGE AND THE EPISTEMIC VALUE OF YORÙBÁ PROVERBS

Abstract

Despite the relatively late recognition as a source of knowledge and justification, testimony plays a significant role in our epistemic endeavours. The paper argued that testimony is a common practice in epistemic endeavours. Due to its social character, testimony provides a unique dimension to knowledge acquisition. This paper explored the social character of testimonial knowledge and argued that testimony is an inevitable practice to give or receive pieces of information within the day-to-day experience. Affirming the commonplace of testimony in our epistemic practice, Hume opines that there are no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eyewitnesses and spectators. Situated within Yorùbá conceptual scheme, the paper identied further that proverbs play a significant role in testimonial knowledge among the Yorùbá. Through a historical survey and critical analysis of the Yorùbá conceptual scheme, it is evident that proverbs serve as a reservoir of wisdom and guide for the practical living among the people. Furthermore, they contain philosophical issues that cut across epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, logic, and aesthetics. This is in support of the interest of advocates of social epistemology that society and culture influence our epistemic standard, and that knowledge is defined by people's experience within a particular scheme. Therefore, the paper concluded that less arguably, proverbs are veritable instances of knowledge particularly as they share the basic structure of epistemic testimony.