AN EVALUATION OF IMMANUEL KANT’S CRITIQUE OF THE TRADITIONAL RATIONAL PROOFS FOR GOD’S EXISTENCE

Abstract

In the medieval period of philosophy, some philosophers and theologians like Boethius, Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas etc., offered what could be said to be rational proofs for God’s existence. Aquinas tried to demonstrate the existence of God using the cosmological arguments in which he argued from what we observe to the existence of that being which is invisible and transcendent. Anselm came up with the ‘ontological argument’ in which he described God as ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’. Obviously, Anselm’s ontological argument for God’s existence is purely rationalistic and centres basically on the power of reason. In the modern period of philosophy, Rene Descartes articulated a newer version of the ontological argument for God’s existence, basing completely on unaided power of human reason. Descartes distrusted the senses, and saw reason as the true source of objective knowledge. G. W. Leibniz has also similar view about human reason. However, Immanuel Kant criticized all efforts made by philosophers to rationally demonstrate the existence of God, and insists that human reason cannot offer us certain knowledge beyond the domain of possible experience. Thus, this write-up focuses on an evaluation of Kant’s critique of the traditional proofs for God’s existence. It submits that human reason cannot certainly delve into the domain of divinity without involving itself in one error or the other. Human reason can guarantee certain knowledge only within the domain of possible experience. God and other supra-sensible entities are not within the domain of possible experience. It is obvious that the domain of belief is quite different from the domain of reason. Human reason can err if it is extended beyond its limits. The implication of this is that God ought to be approached with belief (faith) and not with reason. Hence, traditional speculative metaphysicians must acknowledge the limit of human reason as a cognitive faculty.