Democratic Breakdown and Military Ascendancy in Mali

Abstract

In the heart of West Africa, where the promise of postcolonial sovereignty once stirred hopes of democratic renewal, the shadow of the military looms persistently over fragile state institutions. Mali, emblematic of this regional malaise, has become a crucible of political disillusionment, insurgency, and foreign entanglement. This study interrogates the recurrent collapse of democratic governance and the rise of military rule in Mali through the lens of Samuel P. Huntington’s theory of praetorianism. Anchored in a qualitative methodological approach, the study employs the documentary method and textual analysis to critically examine secondary data, ranging from policy documents, academic publications, and international reports to media archives, focusing on events from the 2012 coup to Mali’s latest political transitions. The findings reveal that military interventions in Mali are not isolated disruptions but systemic responses to structural fragilities, including weak state capacity, endemic corruption, and growing public disillusionment with democratic institutions. The military has exploited popular frustrations to position itself as a guardian of national stability, thereby perpetuating a “coup trap” that undermines democratic consolidation. Furthermore, the study argues that international actors like France, MINUSMA, and ECOWAS have, through securitised and self-interested interventions, inadvertently legitimised military rule in Mali and reinforced neo-imperialist perceptions. It concludes that Mali’s crisis reveals the failure of procedural democracy and liberal internationalism in postcolonial settings. The study calls for inclusive national dialogue, decentralised development, and a reorientation of external engagement toward locally grounded democratic institution-building and civic empowerment, contributing to broader debates on military politics and postcolonial governance.