IGBO TRADITIONAL ETHICS: A CRITIQUE OF KANT’S IDEA OF AFRICAN RATIONAL MORALITY

Abstract

The basic principle of Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy is that reason is the foundation or basis of our status as moral agents. Capitalizing on this, Kant implicitly excluded Africans and other races apart from the white race from the status of moral agents because in his rather neglected or forgotten works – anthropology and physical geography, Kant had alluded that Africans lack rationality because of their race and skin colour. This paper interrogates the authenticity of Kant’s cultural framework upon which he constructed a rational morality which excludes Africa from the scheme of things. Hence, the paper is a refutation of the Kantian position, drawing insights from the Igbo traditional moral thinking. In what follows, I argue that the Kantian project aimed at the exclusion of Africa from the universal rationality is quite contradictory and grossly misconstrued.