THE NEXUS OF FREEWILL THEODICY, MORAL EVIL AND THE DOCTRINE OF DETERMINISM

Abstract

In providing a solution to the problem of evil, Alvin Plantinga attributes evil to the consequences of freewill. Alvin Plantinga argues that it is logically impossible for God to create free persons and still determine their actions. The freewill argument asserts that it would be logically inconsistent for God to prevent evil by coercion and curtailing freewill, because that would no longer be freewill. This position seems to undermine the doctrine of determinism and the supremacy of God over the affairs of humans. Thus, it has generated a lot of controversies that posed a serious threat to the existence of the omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good God. The theological question is: can free will be compatible with the doctrine of determinism? The objective of this research is to establish the nexus between freewill and the doctrine of determinism to reconcile the duo. It will take a step further in supporting the moral responsibility of man. The paper employs descriptive, historical, and phenomenological research methodologies. This paper concludes that though humans’ behaviour could be determined, humans still have meaningful control over their decisions and actions. Freedom of will is compatible with determinism because there is a relationship between God’s sovereignty and humans’ responsibility.