A Normative Examination of Truth and Belief

Abstract

t The claim that truth is a norm of belief is prevalent among many philosophers. The proponents of this claim argue that belief aims at truth, and our objective for believing a proposition or an assertion is to create true beliefs. Some philosophers, however, disagree with this claim. Although the latter acknowledge the link between belief and truth, they reject the notion that this link is normative in nature. Moreover, they oppose any inherent connection between truth and belief, insisting that this connection lacks any normative element. Thus, the main source of disagreement among these philosophers is how to understand the precise relationship between truth and belief on the one hand, and the extent to which truth regulates belief on the other hand. This paper consists of two interrelated objectives. Firstly, the paper examines the reasons for the claim that belief aims at truth and argues that there are good grounds to justify this claim. The second objective is a consequence and extension of the first. Employing the analytical, evaluative and critical methods of research, this paper distinctly discusses the relationship between truth and belief from a teleological perspective. It shows how truth functions as the goal of belief by inspiring the believer. The paper acknowledges that truth may not always be the only aim of belief. However, it strongly asserts that even in cases where other aims of belief are present, belief primarily aims at truth. It is expected that this research will lead to a deeper understanding and appreciation of the function of truth in the formation of belief. This will further enable the reader become more aware of the normative value of truth.