Perspectives on Other Minds' Problem

Abstract

This paper investigates the question of the problem of 'others' within the scope of philosophy of mind. The problem of other minds in philosophy is an epistemological problem. It is the problem concerned with how our beliefs about the mental states other than our own might be justified. Some philosophers agree that the problem of other minds is concerned with the fundamental issue of what entitles us to our basic belief that other human beings (individual or persons) do have inner lives rather than whether we are able in specific cases to be sure what is happening in those inner lives. The aim of this paper is to explore the fundamental philosophical issue concerning other minds from various perspectives, and show that Husserl's method of transcendental phenomenology is a more plausible attempt in resolving the problem of other minds. This position evolves from the fact that, Husserl in his numerous essays and presentations, has always intended that his phenomenology becomes a universal and objective principle of ascertaining the truth about understanding the other. His method therefore comfortably allows us to experience and understand the feelings, desires, and beliefs of others in a more direct manner