

# CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE AND INCAPACITY OF THE NIGERIAN STATE: IMPLICATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

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## Abstract

*In this paper, I argue the view that poor performance of Nigerian state results from the state's incapacity to resolve the problems of governance. I further insist that Nigeria state's crisis of governance is shown in state's ineptitude to secure the lives and property of the citizens, promote the rule of law, and offer apt leadership. Consequently, the failure of the state in these three cardinal areas, just named, constitute a great hindrance to sustainable development in Nigeria. To support this claim, I shall refer to the activities of the government to demonstrate that non-visionary leadership largely points to state inability to drive forward governance. I shall pursue a critical stance and source data from primary observations as a Nigerian, and secondary library sources.*

**Keywords:** Governance, Rule of law, Security of lives and property, Leadership, State incapacity.

## Introduction

Why many African states are still bogged down with the challenges of good governance? After the third wave of democracy in the 1990s (Huntington 1993), nearly all African states became democratic. While “good governance,” for our purposes, stands for the process of decision-making, how government and civil society take decisions, and the implementation of the decisions (Kahar and Nath 2018), “democracy” is etymologically understood to mean government of the people. In what comes to the same thing, Yagbojeya and Akinola (2019) define democracy attractively as “the people's rule.” Of the countries that embraced democracy, a handful few are engaged in their pursuit of good governance. Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Morocco,

Kenya set out on the right foot for good governance. According to Ibrahim Index (2018, p. 17) of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, Côte d'Ivoire has been constantly improving for 2008-2017 with the score (+ 12.7) points, while Morocco has progressed to (+7.3) points, and Kenya ameliorated to (+ 6.1 ) point. In spite of African Union's stance in its plan to transform and develop Africa (African Union's Commission, 2015), many African states are backing down from embracing good governance. Why is good governance proving problematic for developing countries, especially for African

states? Why does Nigeria, in spite of her natural endowments, fail to rise to the challenges of good governance? Why does the Nigerian state lack the capacity to perform?

I argue the view that poor performance of the Nigerian state is attributable to her failure to engage in good governance.

Good governance implicates governance reforms (Mbaku, 2018, pp. 23-32). This means reform of institutions and a design of a newly democratic constitution. The recent uprisings in Nigeria, where the different ethnic nations threaten to break away (self-determination), result from the Nigerian state leadership's refusal to undertake institutional reforms. The 1999 constitution, which sections the Nigerian lawmakers amend piecemeal, is the sole handiwork of the military dictator and is nothing but decrees. Rather than draw up a newly democratic constitution, the lawmakers insist on patchwork of some sections. This strategy reflects the leadership's lack of political will to design a new constitution. Both institutional reforms and the enthronement of a democratic constitution have a significant purpose in governance. Institutional reforms hinder any dictatorship from either forcefully removing a democratically elected government, forestall weak and purposeless leadership, and internecine conflicts. It promotes economic transformation, service delivery, sustainable development, and offers peace and security to the citizens. Those African countries, engaged in the pursuit of good governance, have embarked upon far-reaching institutional reforms and drawn up democratic constitutions. The Nigerian state is grouped together with Afghanistan, Iraq, among the first three countries impacted with terrorism, according to Dudley (2019). Burdened with poor, and ineffective structures, it has proved an uphill task for a naturally endowed Nigerian state to fight off poverty and make any headway in human resources development. The consequences are anarchy, the emergence of the Hobbesian Leviathan, or nihilism. Only a recourse to the Kantian balance of reason may possibly lead to the renewed and firm pursuit of good governance. Although the paper is interdisciplinary, cutting across history, political science, public administration etc, I shall privilege the philosophical perspective.

My strategy is to critically draw the dire consequences of the Nigerian state's incapacity to perform responsibly in the fields of rule of law, security, and leadership only. In these areas, I shall demonstrate the failure of the Nigerian government to deliver requisite services to its citizenry. This incapacity impacts on sustainable development. I shall not venture into a detailed demonstration of the Nigerian state's incapacity in the stipulated areas. Rather, it suffices for our purposes to illustrate state incapacity in terms of lack of the political will, neglect and failure to embrace the salient features of good governance in government's activities and policies. The paper has four sections and a conclusion. Section one deals with the idea of good governance and the idea of capacity of the state. Stipulating the core pillars of governance, the paper argues the need for the Nigerian state to embrace the challenges of good governance. The second section evaluates the Nigerian state's

underperformance in security, and the rule of law - all a result of its ineffective leadership. The underperformance results from its unsuccessful leadership (Achebe 1988). Section three discusses the effects of the failure to embrace good governance and the various options open to the government. Section four discusses Kant's balance of reason as a guide to the Nigerian state's embrace of good governance. It graphically examines the implications of good governance for sustainable development. Finally, the paper ends with a conclusion.

### **State Capacity**

The Nigerian state, like many African states, is persistently criticised for its underperformance. It functions far below expectations. This underperformance arises from the state's lack of capacity. This lack derives not from the absence of this capacity but its inept leadership to pursue good governance. This is the prevalent view among scholars like Yagboyaju and Akinola (2019, pp. 1-2) and Akinola (2018). Lack of state capacity entails inability to drive development and to deliver on good governance. More positively, Yahaya (2004, p. 167) defines a state capacity thus: Capacity in its context of public sector is the ability of the government, by the combination of resources, to design and implement good policies for sustainable development, promote human welfare and create enabling environment for economic growth and prosperity. Any government, which is incapable of effectively discharging its responsibilities, as listed above, is no longer functioning adequately as it should. Such a government, as Yahaya (2004) describes it, has not much to show in terms of the rule of law, security, and political authority. Such a state would face several problems like anarchy, ethnic violence especially in Africa, and nepotism. The state is tending gradually towards collapse. While some thinkers refer to such a state of affairs in a state as evident signs of state collapse, the World Bank (1997) sees it as state incapacity. According to Akinola (2018, p. 88), a state works when it plays its role, fulfills its functions effectively vis-à-vis the citizens and the population occupying its territory. This would mean that government ensures equality and promotes fundamental human rights. There is no ceiling to what responsibility the government engages in. The government's responsibility to the state and its citizens is ever expansive and englobing than merely undertaking a limited one.

### **Good Governance**

Not until Plato had proposed the idea of philosopher-king as his solution to the problem of governance in the Athenian Greek city-state did philosophers elaborate theories about the complexities of governance. So intricate was governance that he maintained that the world would hardly know peace unless rulers become philosophers or philosophers become rulers (Plato Republic). African Development Bank ((2000) insists that good governance is founded on three pillars: (i) effective state, (ii) mobilised civil society, and (iii) an efficient private sector. Generally, the component elements of good governance for several scholars are generally essentially the same. Kahar and Nath (2018, 1000342) insist that the elements are

participatory in nature: combatting corruption, raising accountability of actors and promoting transparency in the functioning of the state. These features portray a certain conception of government – a participatory form of government. Nzongala-Ntala (2003) proposes three aspects of governance. They are as follows:

*(i) Political Public Governance.*

This type of governance has to do with “the processes by which a society organises its affairs and manages them. Any of these - the state, government, or public sector constitutes the source of its authority;

*(ii) Economic Governance*

*This concerns the private sector and deals with “the policies, processes, and institutional mechanisms pertinent to service delivery”;*

*(iii) Social Governance*

This is yet another type of governance which, according to Nzongala-Ntala (2003), is the type of governance that has to do with a “system of values and beliefs necessary for social behaviours to happen and for public decisions to be taken.” These three types of governance interface, cooperate and generate development. A question arises, what does governance crisis in African states signal? Simply stated, it is failure of governance.

### **Failure of Governance**

For the purposes of this paper, I shall limit my discussion of crisis of governance in Nigeria to select fields of government. These areas include security, rule of law, and leadership. I shall begin with security.

*(i) Security*

Thinkers insist that there exists some relationship between security and development. Foreign investments seek out a peaceful and a welcoming atmosphere. Investors are wary of those regions embroiled in violence. The Global and Peace Index has continuously downgraded Nigeria as one of the restive nations. Out of 158 countries, Nigeria ranked 117th in 2007, 129th in 2008/2009, and 146th in 2012. Thus, Nigeria has once been ranked with Sudan, Iraq, and even Somalia (Omilusi, 2013). A state, which lacks the capacity to secure life and property in its territory, is a failed state Omilusi (2013, pp. 1-9). Here Omilusi maintains the view that the loss of state security services implies the non-existence of the state. As he put it, the state plays the role of the “guarantor of last resort of personal safety, liberty and property of the citizen.” He distinguishes between the external and internal aspects of security. Further, he specifies the two dimensions of the internal spectrum of the security of the state: state security and the people's security. Relating to the people, Omilusi (2013) explains that security in no way refers to any use of arms. Rather, it consists in meeting the citizens' needs - the social, political, cultural, economic and

human rights. To assure the people's security in times of need is "the only and best guarantee of security of the state" (Omilusi, 2013, pp. 1-4). The external dimension of the security of the state refers to foreign armed invasion of a state. Following the thought, Omilusi (2013) and Nzongala-Ntalaja (2013, pp. 96-97) insist human security is double-pronged.

In the first place, it refers to a shield against violence and in the second, it refers to provision of access to people's rights to education, initial healthcare, supply of the basic amenities, right to clean environment, ready response to disasters like the provision of COVID-19 palliatives, etc. Nigeria boasts of various levels of state security institutions and services. Despite those levels of insecurity, palpable insecurity exists in Nigeria. Nigeria's economy depends entirely on oil. The South-South region of the state is the locus for tremendous oil reserves in the country. Ethnic strifes among different ethnic nations did envelope the region in the past. The flaring of gas, the nonchalance of various corporations about the environmental pollution of the region - together drew the ire of the region to engage in wanton destruction of the corporations' equipment, kidnapping, blowing up the oil pipelines, etc. Constituting a threat to the state's economy, the Yar' Adua Presidency granted the various warring factions' amnesty. Only recently, some groups have renewed their threats to go on a rampage. Presently, Boko Haram terrorists remain the highest threat to Nigerian state. The Northerners are wont to trace the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria to injustices perpetrated against the Northern region. Yet, the North has been ruling the country for decades! Boko Haram is the last in a series of the North's demands for an Islamic state. Preceded by Maitasine riot, Boko Haram arose as a fledgling Islamic group under Shekau. Unaware of the dangers it posed to the nation, the Federal government (FG) handled the initial emergence of Boko Haram with woolly gloves until the group built up its own armory.

Following in the heels of Boko Haram are the Fulani herders. Although the herders did not belong to any of the agents of security, the FG never deals them any hard blow. The Fulani pastoralists have generated unrest in most parts of the Nigerian state. They maim, rape, kill, kidnap and plunder. Both the Buhari-government and the rampaging Fulani ethnic nation have lost sight of the modern mechanised way of herding cows. The rejection of the peaceful modern avenues of pastoralism has made their activities suspicious. Other regions of the Nigerian state have rejected the Fulani occupation of their ungoverned spaces within their ancestral lands. That the Buhari-led FG turns a blind eye on their activities places the Fulani herders above the law. The emergence of Eastern Nigeria Network (ESN) and Amotekun are traceable to the obnoxious activities of the Fulani herders.

### *(ii) Rule of Law*

This is the next significant element for successful governance, especially in a democratic government. It is not merely sufficient to understand democracy generally as government by the people. The stakes are higher than an emphasis on rule by the people. A state's constitution and an overarching rule of law guarantee a successful

governance and a protection of life and property within a democracy (Yagboyaju and Akinola, 2019, p. 5). In fact, it is the rule of law that gives democracy the bite it possesses, and also affords the people the chance to contend for public offices in a well-organised and responsible elections. Within an established judiciary, the rule of law offers the legal structure for adjudication of disputes and oversees the activities of the executive arm of government. In Nigerian democracy, the judiciary has oftentimes reneged on its duties - especially to check the activities of the executive. A few illustrations here are adequate. Within the First Republic (1960-1966), the judiciary took sides with the executive in the adjudication of the 1965 election petitions. The same scenario played out in the Second Republic (1979-1983) and throughout the military dictatorship. The judiciary served to rubber-stamp the decisions of military tribunals. The Fourth Republic (1999 till the present) has recorded many cases of the judiciary impugning the law. Worth mentioning is the case of President Buhari's dismissal of the Chief Justice of the Nation (CJN) - Chief Justice Onoghen on frivolous grounds. The Judiciary was unable to muster a united front in addressing the issue. This failure influenced the Chief executive to appoint an Islamic Justice as the CJN.

The next instance illustrates the apex court's compromise of the integrity of the judiciary in its adjudication of the winner of the 2018 gubernatorial election in Imo state. The Supreme court of justice declared Mr Hope Uzodimma winner, in an election that placed Uzodimma in the fourth position. In an unguarded moment, Mr Uzodimma admitted to the public that the Chief of Staff - Abba Kyari - facilitated the arrangement. Apart from one chief Justice of the apex court who retracted his position in a retrial, the apex court maintained its position. The outcome is similar to the apex court's decision in the case of President Buhari's non-possession of the First School Leaving Certificate (FSLC). Nigeria's judiciary was written off as no more than a miscarriage of justice. In all the cases, the judiciary fully approved the actions of the executive.

### *(iii) Leadership*

A number of scholars have lampooned the ineptitude of Nigeria's leadership (Achebe 1988). If we divide Nigeria's democracy into four Republics. The First Republic (1960-1966) never lasted long before the military scuttled it. The Second Republic (1979-1983) was much shorter. The Third 'Republic' (1983 and 1984) need not be considered a "republic" because the military dictators combined military rule and some form of representation of the people. The Fourth Republic (1999 till the present) has been so far the longest republic. All through the republics (first, second, fourth), the leadership has proved incapable of steering the affairs of the Nigerian state. Notable for its natural endowment in terms of oil and liquefied natural gas reserves, the leadership has failed to improve the state's poverty index by a great margin. In 2021, Nigeria was designated the World capital of poverty. Not only has the leadership mismanaged the "cheap capital from those natural endowments" (Agbakoba, 2019, p. 297) it has allowed the endowments to waste away.

Leadership has failed to reconstruct its dilapidating refineries, allowing them to waste

away. Nigeria's ongoing project of new refinery is surprisingly located in Niger, a neighbouring country! Most of the nation's industries were shut down between 2015 and 2016 (Vanguard News, p. 16). Until the discovery of oil reserves in meaningful quantity, Nigeria invested previously in agriculture and exported some cash crops. However, the discovery of oil and gas reserves led the leadership into abandoning agriculture. Yet, it has proved incapable of feeding her population, offer its citizens the basic needs of healthcare, basic education, housing, etc. For its extreme pursuit of the Islamic agenda - the Islamisation of Nigeria - Buhari's leadership has failed the nation. Elected on the promise of counterterrorism, the Buhari leadership has failed to deliver on his election promises. Indeed, several parts of the Nigerian state are engaged in tensions of pronounced insecurity of lives and property. The leadership's announcement of the utter defeat of the Boko Haram terrorists was after all a political strategy. For the terrorist group has not only established links with the North African Al-Qaeda, it has amassed armaments for the establishment of the Islamic state of West Africa. Buhari leadership's rejection of restructuring of the Nigerian polity and devolution of political power have provoked some ethnic nations to argue for self-determination.

The outcome of the failure to restructure breeds ethnic restiveness, insecurity and the quest of some ethnic nations to carve themselves out from Nigeria. The specter of Islamic sectarian violence has gradually spread over the continent. The goals of the Islamic sects is to overthrow elected governments in a wave of a renewed Jihad. If France had to intervene in Mali to forestall the Islamic sect from overthrowing a democratically elected government, Nigeria only requires good governance to defeat its own politically bred Boko Haram terrorists - the nightmare of the Nigerian state. The Islamic terrorists in West Africa established strong links with Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM procures the financial support, arms supplies, and offers training to conscripts in Al-Qaeda camps littered throughout Africa. Should the Islamic quest succeed, the continent would be a veritable ground for the fight against Islamist terrorists. War is, however, not the sole indicator of failed governance. Other indicators comprise extreme poverty, unavailable Medicare, HIV/AIDS pandemic, Ebola and other diseases, corruption, rogue states, presidents-for-life syndrome, massive youth unemployment. All that constitute glaring indicators of incapacitated state.

### **Effects of Governance Failure**

The major effect of dysfunctional government is anarchy. The installation of anarchy is no less than Hobbes' idea of a state of nature. Hobbes (1651/2016) not only argues that no state or society exists in the state of nature, above all, he insists that man's life in such a condition is "solitary, nasty, brutish, and short." The emergence of a Leviathan constitutes a huge problem.

Not only are citizens unable to prefer any case in court against him. They remove him either. The Leviathan cannot be charged with injustice towards any subject since he is

free to employ any means to safeguard the people. He maintains absolute power in a civil society and is above the law. There is, however, one constraint against him. The restriction derives from the purpose for which the Leviathan emerged - the protection and safety (self-preservation) of the people whose security the Leviathan guarantees. This is the hidden assumption of Hobbes' arresting story. If eventually the Leviathan fails to preserve the life and property of the people he undertakes to safeguard, then the subjects are free to "disobey and even rebel" (Grayling, 2017, p. 57). Hobbes' idea of human nature on which he founds government is questionable.

Drawing from the situation of the 17th Century England, Hobbes elaborates his idea of government. The 17<sup>th</sup> Century England signaled a situation of scarcity (Orbell and Rutherford, 1973/2009, pp. 383- 409). A state of conflict of necessity would arise if all men go after the same need and the need is scarce. If the need is abundant and everyone could lay his hand on it, there would rarely be conflict or the struggle for it. However, in a state embroiled in anarchy, security is definitely in short supply. Consequently, if human life is not evidently naturally bad, security is always in short supply in a state of anarchy. This means that the rise of the Leviathan is a logical necessity since the Leviathan guarantees security, self-preservation and peace. However, if the Leviathan leads to violence, while providing security, then the emergence of the Leviathan's provision of security must include prevention of violence. Else the project becomes unjustified. If I understand "security" to stand for peace but not absence of violence, the Leviathan has failed in its project. Where the Leviathan is the source of violence, then the figure of a Leviathan renders the project impossible. In the Nigerian state, the emergence of a Leviathan would definitely lead to violence. The selection, the Leviathan's ethnic nation, the fact of the Leviathan being above the law, the Leviathan's contrived injustice against a certain ethnic nation, etc - all that would create a problem in the Nigerian context. Let us consider the military dictators. The military dictators, who annulled the different Republics, pretended to offer some security to the people. In spite of the military rule, various militias had vied among themselves for the control of Nigeria's oil rich region. At the time, war had become, in Okere's expression, "the quintessence of the failure of governance." The situation of war implies the creation of terror and spells the insecurity of life and property. The trend of war in Africa during military rule vegetated different militia groups, the phenomenon of children-soldiers, and led to hordes of thousands of refugees displaced from their homes. It bred youth unemployment, and created an unimaginable movement of sophisticated arms within the continent. In the keeps of rebels and Al-Qaeda militants, the arms proved more dangerous. The rise of the Leviathan would spell anarchy for the Nigerian society. Locke's theory of representative government aims to criticise Hobbesian idea of a Leviathan with absolute powers. Which is why Locke abolished Leviathan's exercise absolute powers and argued that no person was above the law.

### **Kant's Balance of Reason and Good Governance**



Kant's discussion of nature's plan for the human race traces the emergence of reason and man's ability to make a choice between alternatives. Incidentally, these capacities were not the only ones available to man. Nature equally accorded man other indefinite number of other powers to facilitate the human ability to reason and be reasoned with; and also, to choose (Kant 1976:372ff). The development took a gradual process and eventually led to the formation of society. Human beings, possessed social and anti-social virtues. The social virtues made possible association with other people whereas anti-social virtues provoke wars and conflicts. Since as reason is a peculiarity of human beings, so these beings employ reason to sue for peace. People reason with one another to forestall future wars. It is not the case that only evil derives from conflicts. Great technological inventions followed from the World War II. Human reason always chooses a particular line of action rather than another. In this way, man develops great organisations and society. Peculiar to this paper, is the fact that human power of reason chooses between alternatives. Sometimes, it is a case of some desirable object, at another time it goes in pursuit of a non-desirable one like conflict. And this, in spite of the fact that the object of human choice, may be injurious to human society. Consequently, there are two types of reason – reason that, on the one hand, chooses an object commensurate to a human society. On the other hand, the other type of reason makes a choice for an object harmful to human society.

There is, thus, a conflict between the various aspects of reason. This conflict, for Kant, contributes to the growth of human society. The pursuit of good governance and the lack thereof is likened to the place of reason in human society. The pursuit of reason relates to the choice of human beings. Reason guides human choices. In the case of the choice between anarchy and good governance, it is up to reason to make the choice. Unless there is a deformation of reason, it will make the choice for the best. In this case, reason goes for good governance rather than anarchy. Why has reason not made the choice for a long time since the third wave of democracy? Events in history and nature will definitely suggest a pursuit of good governance in trying times. Once made, the features of good governance would become manifest in Nigeria. It would lead to sustainable development and service delivery in Nigeria.

### **Evaluation**

The implications of Nigerian state's failure to embrace good governance robs off on sustainable development. Unless the leadership undertakes massive institutional reforms, a drawing of a democratic constitution, the chances for the enthronement of anarchy in the state are not far-fetched. About institutional reforms, the restructuring of the state and the decentralization of powers require urgent attention. There is the lopsidedness in the issue of political leadership. Judging from the first to the Fourth Republics, a particular ethnic nation - the Fulani ethnic nation - has accessed national political power far more than other ethnic nations did. The idea of political leadership of the nation as the birthright of this ethnic nation was incidentally born. This fact has

become so significant in Nigerian polity that other ethnic nations threaten to break away if massive reforms are not undertaken in this regard. Following the civil war (1966-1970), the Igbo ethnic nation has been hindered from gaining access to political power. Yet, the war ended a long time ago. Just as one ethnic nation purposes to constitute national political power in Nigeria a birthright, so also an ethnic nation has been obstructed from access to political leadership. Nigeria possesses a 1999 decree-orientated Constitution. It is seen as a dictator's constitution ever since the military dictator (in civilian garb) restructured it with the help of some legal luminaries.

The Constitution truly establishes the principles of separation and the decentralisation of powers. In spite of these principles, the constitution still reserves certain powers to the President, unshared and particular to him. Although the National Assembly is empowered to legislate on some matters in the list, the State House of Assembly does not possess similar powers. Consequently, there are discrepancies in the system of government, discrepancies that could readily be resolved from the beginning (Ogwezzy, 2019, pp. 180-196). A great feature of the 1999 Constitution is its emphasis on the federal ideology of governance. Given Nigerian state's multiethnic population, the preferred system of government has been the idea of a federation. The idea of the federation of the 1960s concisely emphasised the different regions, which regions maintained their autonomy, international relations, economy, etc. The centre maintained a central army and the police for the security of the nation. The federation worked out well until the military intervened. Ever since, the idea of Nigerian federation lost its peculiar elements. It came to prioritise quota system and to benefit the Northerners. Institutional reforms have to comprise a re-conception of the idea of the federation of yore. In this regard each region develops on its own and oversees its own economy. Whatever problems there are, it would be far easier for the regions to pursue good governance and develop on their own than the amorphous entity that is Nigeria.

In a recent publication, Suberu (2018) profusely adulates the political leadership of President Buhari. He presents the Buhari regime as committed to fighting corruption. As objective as the paper is, it lacks adequate touch with the reality of the Nigerian situation. President Buhari was elected on the platform of his anti-corruption stance. As a military dictator, who sacked a democratically elected government, General Buhari undertook to clean up the nation's orgy of corruption. With the help of Brigadier Idiagbon, his brief rule, lasting for two years, emphasised anti-corruption and a war against indiscipline. So brief was their rule that the Nigerian citizenry did not get the chance to assess it. Currently, as a civilian President, President Buhari has spearheaded the worst democratic government in Nigeria. Acting *ultra vires*, the President has fraudulently rigged presidential elections, sponsored Islamisation program of Nigeria, and consistently marginalised a region of the country - the South East - just because the region did not vote for him. He has flouted the idea of the federal character in all his appointments. Indeed, he appointed his close relations and

core northern Muslims to many

Federal and key positions. It is true that the Prime Minister David Cameron at the onset of President Buhari's Presidency referred to the Nigerian state as "fantastically corrupt" (Suberu, 2018, pp. 184-201). Were he to visit Nigeria presently, he would be baffled with the stupendous corruption that undergirds Buhari's administration.

### Conclusion

After more than six decades, Nigeria finds it difficult to stand on a solid footing. It is still trying to find adequate solutions to the teething problems of state building. The recent popular presidential candidate represents the great hope of the people to resolve the Nigerian problem. Whoever provides good leadership has already resolved the problem of governance by a half. That is the meaning of Achebe's claim that leadership is the core problem of the Nigerian state. The implications for Africans, not just for Nigerians, remain enormous.

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