EVALUATING THE INFLUENCE OF TECHNOLOGICAL ARTEFACTS ON HUMAN ACTION

Abstract

Technological artefacts can be characterized as material objects made by human agents as a means to achieve practical ends. These artefacts primarily influence human actions in two basic ways. They can be instruments, enabling and facilitating actions as their presence affect the options for action available to us. They can also influence our actions in a morally more salient way when their presence affects the likelihood that we will actually perform or abstain from performing certain actions. In this paper, we develop a descriptive account of the influence of technological artefacts on what we actually do in terms of the ways in which facts about those artefacts affect our reasons for action. The main purpose of this paper is to offer a plausible description of how the presence of artefacts can influence human actions. Our particular claim is that artefacts can play this role because facts about them influence our reason for action. This hooks up our investigation to theories of practical rationality and (good) reasons for action, and thus facilitates the moral and rational evaluation of the particular influences the presence of artefacts has on our actions. The study shows how our investigation can deal with the phenomena covered by Latour's prescription and Verbeek's invitation. We will also suggest a specification of these concepts, which might otherwise be taken to obscure rather than clarify the various ways in which the presence of technological artefacts can influence our actions. Yet, this study insists that what people actually do, and which artefacts they actually use, is up to them. The study also attempts an analysis of why the presence of artefacts sometimes fails to influence our actions, contrary to designer expectations or intentions.