HENRY BERGSON'S NOTION OF SELF: A CRITICAL EVALUATION

Abstract

The problem of the self in the history of philosophy borders on questions such as these: Does the self exist? Can the self be known? Is the self fixed or continuous? Henri Bergson (1859-1941), among others, believes that the self exists. Self, for him is the 'I', as a reality which each of us seizes from within, by intuition and not by intellect or simple analysis. It is a reality that serves as a window to the wider stream of reality. As a reality, the Self is free and mobile; it is something in the making, not something made; it is changing states, not self-maintained states. The Self, according to Bergson, can only be understood in terms of duration (duree), which stands for a unified flow of time or becoming. The Self, for Bergson, is therefore characterized by pure mobility, free will, unforeseeable novelty and creativity. The main purpose of this discourse is to examine the concept of the Self from Henri Bergson's perspective. Quantitative research method was adopted. Data from these sources were analysed using textual exposition, historical and evaluative methods. The discourse reveals that: Bergson's perspective on the concept of the self could not provide a good account of the self. He wrongly used the word mobility and change interchangeably. He implicitly denies the fact of identity of the self over time. But he should however be commended for championing the revival of speculative metaphysics; and calling man back to his root by showing that life is larger than logic.