VIRTUE IN THE DIVINE COMMAND THEORY OF ETHICS FROM THE SOKOTO CALIPHATE SCHOLARS

Abstract

This paper gives attention to the argument for divine command theory (DCT) of ethics, the notion that morality depends upon God's command. Philosophers have discussed this theory in relations to the Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam). Among them are those who argue against this theory and those who prolifically defend it. Some Jewish scholars, like Immanuel Jakobovits, argue that Jewish tradition supports DCT, while others, like Aharon Lichtenstein, object the argument on the ground that tradition denies this view. According to the common law, the opposite of all evil fall under a divine command. Thus, it is not possible that anyone rightly engage in evil acts, because they are not performed meritoriously. And if they should be done by any meritoriously, then they would not be called evil. Therefore, some philosophers understand that any evil act is not commanded by the divine. Then, do we conceptualise ethics from theological perspective? The paper attempts answering this by analytic method, considering the idea of DCT on virtue, an ethical conducts to which the Sokoto Caliphate scholars give a divine command theory explanation. The paper questions how virtue is theorised by philosophers, especially in the utilitarian view, and how it relate to the ideas of the Sokoto Caliphate scholars. The outcome shows that morality, according to those scholars, has its riots in religious instruction, and that a society can chose to apply the divine command ethical theory for the moral setting of its people to achieve political, social and economic development.