A Critique of Heideggerian Theory 0f “‘Meaning’ as ‘Use’”

Abstract

The neologistic revolution of Heideggerian language specifically being-in-the-world, Dasein and formal indication has marked his thought as phenomenologically and ontologically in-depth. Heidegger argued of a failure in ordinary language to mirror reality thus expressing their ontological root, that is being and meaningfulness. Neologism thus, shows the correspondence between language and ontology, and by phenomenological analysis, one is able to reach meaning, phenomenologically and ontologically. This paper however faults such neologism as ready-tohand, present-at-hand and equipment. The engagement with such terms by Heidegger, is ontical, utilitarian, pragmatic and materialistic. Heidegger, rather than trace the ontological conditions of Seinedes within Being and meaning, argued that despite Seinedes being a part of being, it is unmeaningful and absurd. In order to validate this claim, hence the existence of such neologism as being-in, being-by, being-with, in-order-to implies individual meaningfulness, synergic with Dasein under Being, he interchangeably employed the term ‘use’ as being synonymous with ‘meaning’, but only in reference to Seinedes. ‘Use’ does not capture the fundamental essence of a being. It is only one type of how something fits into its context, a particular context at that time, and at a particular point in time. This paper concludes that meaning as use does not capture the meaningfulness in Seinedes, nor itsbeing-in as a ‘with’ other beings whether ontic or ontological. The method used in this research is hermeneutics.