EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF DAVID HUME’S CRITIQUE OF CAUSATION IN LAW AND MORALITY

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to uncover the epistemological origin or foundation of David Hume’s critique and denial of causation in law and morality. It has been re-echoed a couple of times by lawyers and judges that legal judgment is premised upon rational argument and that judgments are deductions from reasoned arguments. Although Hume vehemently denied this as untrue, it behooves on this paper to uncover the foundation of this kind of philosophy which argues that morality and law are not matters of fact but products of passions and sentiments of the legal officer at work. The discovery of this foundation will help set the goal straight for the significance and implication of this form of reasoning in law and morality at large. Counting from daily experiences, it is not deniable to say like Hume that judgments of law and morality are matters of individual persons’ sentiments: likes and dislikes, passion and apathy or sympathy as the case may be. The method of this articulation is analysis while the arguments therein follows the evaluative process and critical reasoning.