AN INTERPRETATIVE ANALYSIS OF EDMUND HUSSERL'S CONCEPT OF INTENTIONALITY

摘要

This paper makes an interpretative analysis of the concept of intentionality in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. Although ‘intentionality’ is a technical term in philosophy, it stands for something familiar to us all: a characteristic feature of our mental states and experiences, especially evident in what we commonly call being “conscious” or “aware”. The aim of this paper is to show that the domain of phenomenology is understanding the conscious object of qualitative experience in relation to how they are conscious, the forms of being aware, the modes of intentionality. In other to understand his concept of intentionality, Husserl in the Ideas, introduces the pair of terms, Noesis and Noema to refer to correlated elements of the structure of any intentional act. The term noesis to refer to intentional acts or “act-quality” and noema to refer to what, in the Logical Investigations had been referred to as “act-matter”. He also says that every intentional act has noetic content. This noetic content is that mental act-process, which becomes directed towards the intentionally held object. Every act also has a Noematic correlate that which is meant by it. According to Husserl, noesis is the real part of the act that gives the character to a thing. Noema is the ideal essence of the character. The crucial concept in Husserl’s theory of intentionality is the noema of consciousness. According to Husserl the full noema is the object of the act as meant in the act, the perceived object as perceived, the judged object as judged, and so on. Therefore, Husserl's definition of consciousness in terms of intentionality marks a revolutionary innovation in the history of modern philosophy.