CRITIQUE OF BERTRAND RUSSELL'S LOGIC OF RELATION

Abstract

The study is an examination of Bertrand Russell's logic of relations. In logic of relation, Russell aptly showed that while language is a tool for communication, logic serves as the instrument for the construction of the structure of language. However, the study discovered that Bertrand Russell's logic of relation failed to prove that the analytic or empiricist position about the rationalist conception of knowledge is not tenable. The study analyzed that Russell's conception of knowledge especially his logic of relations influenced the conception of his epistemology. The study further showed that while language is the tool for formulating scientific thought, logic is a tool of analysis of language, the reasoning process, and the manner in which language and reasoning are related to reality. The work employed the qualitative research design where data were sourced from books, journals and periodicals to examine Bertrand Russell's logic of relations. In line with the above, the work adopts the methodology of critico-analytic. Using the critico-analytic method, the study purposively examined some selected texts which are very relevant to the work. Some of the texts include: (1) Russell B., nd Logic and knowledge. (2) Russell B., Principia Mathematica. Vol. 12 edition. (3) The Problems of Philosophy. The study observed that Russell's conclusion that “all human knowledge is uncertain, inexact and partial” is inadequate and a contradiction of his aim in his logic of relation. Russell's position in his logic of relation that logic could form the basis of a language that could accurately express everything that could be clearly stated is defective. This study concludes that strict empiricism leads predictably to radical skepticism and cannot sufficiently account for the a priori knowledge we possess.