SOLIPSISM, PRIVATE LANGUAGE, AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER MINDS: IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Abstract

An enquiry into solipsism, as an epistemological problem in philosophy, would largely correlate with the private language argument, especially as advanced by Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's discourse on language generally contrasts private language with public language. Whereas solipsism accords with private language, arguments in favour of public language invariably favour the possibility of knowing other minds. Presupposing that there is a necessary connection between mind and matter or the mental and the physical aspects of man, this study advances the thesis that one can gain a considerable knowledge of other minds through their external or physical manifestations or expressions. In addition to establishing the possibility of knowing other minds from the background of Wittgenstein's private language argument and the refutation of solipsism and skepticism, this discourse highlights the imports of such knowledge in interpersonal relationship. In other words, in the light of Wittgenstein's conception of language as an all-embracing feature of man's existence, it examines the extent to which the knowledge of other minds can advance man's social intercourse. Thus, a rational investigation into the possibility of knowing other minds, the extent or degree of such knowledge, and the establishment of its usefulness constitute the basic concerns of this philosophical enquiry. Save being an expository discourse, therefore, the study aims at expanding the boundaries of human knowledge by exploring the implications of the essential constituents of its subject matter.