AN APPRAISAL OF LEFKOWTZ’S NOTION OF MORAL OBLIGATION TO OBEY THE LAW

Abstract

Lefkowitz claims that law-subjects are morally obligated to obey the law of the state because it is their natural duty not only to respect the right of others, but also to participate in and support states whose state of affairs, foster the respect for these rights. The law by virtue of citizens’ participation becomes a product of contract on what constitutes citizens’ basic moral rights and duties; and citizens are by virtue of such contract obligated to obey such laws. However, Lefkowitz did not completely address the puzzle bewildering the moral obligation to obey the law, because his contractualist position presents the difficulty bordering on the extent at which non-participants of a contract-based law are morally obligated to obey such law to which they are oblivious of. Nonetheless, this paper rejects the anarchists position that denies any moral ground for an obligation to obey the law; and defends that establishing prima facie basis for an obligation to obey the law is possible and justifiable only if it appeals to the consciences of the subjects on whom such laws tend to morally bind. Thus, the recommendation that a more conscience-compelling basis for obeying the law lies in the conception of the ‘telos’ of the law as being spirited towards the consolidation (for the common good) of ‘solidarity’─ a construct bespeaking of an ontological condition of interdependence in which law-subjects are placed. For a good appraisal of Lefkowitz, the qualitative research design, with the historical, analytical and evaluative methods were adopted.