AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM OF EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

Abstract

The notion of knowledge as justified belief was, for centuries, the acceptable analysis of the justification of knowledge claims. This was the traditional analysis of the concept of knowledge and it has its origins in Plato’s ‘Theaetetus’. However, Gettier’s ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’1 challenged this notion of knowledge as justified true belief. Employing the method of counter-examples, Gettier argues that the satisfaction of the three conditions traditionally associated with the verification of knowledge claims (first, the given proposition is true; second, the condition that the epistemic subject believes the proposition to be true and third; the epistemic subject is justified in believing that the proposition is true) does not guarantee justification or knowledge. Employing the hermeneutic and argumentative methods, this paper attempts an examination of the problem of epistemic justification.